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LINE DRAWING IN CORPORATE RIGHTS
DETERMINATIONS
Elizabeth Pollman*
INTRODUCTION
Corporations are extraordinarily diverse and vary along multiple
dimensions.  An individual can transform her business from a sole
proprietorship to a corporation with a simple incorporation filing.1
Some corporations remain small by all measures, with just a small
handful of shareholders, employees, customers, suppliers, and
creditors.
If the individual takes on a significant number of employees or
outside investments to grow the business, the dynamics of the business
organization change.  As the corporation grows, it might establish a
formal board of directors to manage the corporation.2  Some corpora-
tions have a small number of shareholders but a large social footprint
with nationwide business, revenues in the billions, and thousands of
employees.3  Some corporations have a small number of shareholders
but are on a pathway to existing as a larger institution, raising capital
from national exchanges, and forming an independent board of
directors.4
Large publicly traded corporations often have thousands of share-
holders that are an ever-changing group, employees in numbers that
exceed those of small towns or cities, and complex business arrange-
* Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles.  Thanks to Margaret Blair, Michael
Guttentag, Gregory Mark, and Eric Orts for helpful conversations and comments.
1. See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW § 2.2 (2d ed. 2009) (“Incorporating a busi-
ness is an astonishingly simple process.”). See generally 1A WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER,
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 129 (2010) (describing the conditions for
incorporation).
2. See generally BRAD FELD & MAHENDRA RAMSINGHANI, STARTUP BOARDS: GETTING THE
MOST OUT OF YOUR BOARD OF DIRECTORS 81 (2014) (describing the role of the board of direc-
tors); Elizabeth Pollman, Team Production Theory and Private Company Boards, 38 SEATTLE U.
L. REV. 619, 626–34 (2015) (discussing the evolution of private company boards).
3. See Andrea Murphy, America’s Largest Private Companies 2014, FORBES (Nov. 5, 2014,
6:16 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/andreamurphy/2014/11/05/americas-largest-private-comp
anies-2014/.
4. See generally Pollman, supra note 2, at 625–35 (discussing the range of private corporations, R
including startup companies, that may grow significantly over time, and other private corpora-
tions, some of which may remain small businesses).
597
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ments that involve many corporate participants and stakeholders.  For
example, ExxonMobil Corporation (ExxonMobil) has a market capi-
talization of over $350 billion, international operations with annual
sales revenue of nearly $400 billion, over 75,000 employees, several
divisions and hundreds of affiliates, and stock traded on the New York
Stock Exchange, which enables a rapidly changing group of share-
holders.5  A significant portion of ExxonMobil’s stock is held by insti-
tutional owners and mutual funds,6 intermediaries that add another
layer of management between the company and the beneficial owners
of the stock.7  Derivatives and other financial instruments have also
increased the complexity and potential diversity of interests among
shareholders.8
Multinational enterprises, or corporate groups, are composed of nu-
merous corporations or other legal entities.9  For example, Google
Inc. previously reported ownership of thirty separate domestic subsid-
iaries and over fifty international subsidiaries.10  Google Ireland Hold-
ings is a corporation that receives profits from sales around the world,
which it moves through Google Netherlands Holdings BV to another
entity, Google Bermuda Unlimited, where the corporate profits are
not taxed.11  These complex groupings are also subject to change, as
illustrated by Google’s recent announcement that it restructured its
multinational enterprise under a new holding company, Alphabet
5. See # 91 Exxon Mobil, FORBES, http://www.forbes.com/companies/exxon-mobil/ (last up-
dated May 2015). See generally Exxon Mobil Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 25,
2015), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/34088/000003408815000013/xom10k2014.htm
(summarizing ExxonMobil’s financial performance in 2014).
6. Exxon Mobil Corporation (XOM), YAHOO! FIN., https://finance.yahoo.com/q/mh?s=xom
+Major+Holders (last visited Mar. 17, 2015) (indicating that institutional and mutual fund own-
ers own 51% of ExxonMobil’s shares).
7. Jill E. Fisch, Securities Intermediaries and the Separation of Ownership from Control, 33
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 877, 879  (2010) (“[T]he intermediation of the U.S. capital markets exacer-
bates the traditional separation of ownership and control—as identified by Berle and Means—
by adding a second layer of agency issues.”).
8. See, e.g., Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting and Hid-
den (Morphable) Ownership, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 811, 828–30 (2006) (discussing how investors
use derivative instruments to engage in empty voting).
9. See generally Virginia Harper Ho, Team Production & the Multinational Enterprise, 38
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 499 (2015) (discussing the governance of multinational enterprises).
10. Google Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at exh. 21.01 (Mar. 1, 2007).
11. This example comes from Jonathan Levy, From Fiscal Triangle to Passing Through: Rise
of the Nonprofit Corporation (Tobin Project Working Paper (manuscript at 47)) (on file with
author); see also Romain Dillet, Google Is Preparing To Pay a Huge Fine for Tax Noncompli-
ance in France, TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 25, 2014), http://techcrunch.com/2014/04/25/google-is-prepar
ing-to-pay-a-huge-fine-for-tax-noncompliance-in-france/; Vanessa Houlder, ‘Dutch Sandwich’
Grows as Google Shifts C= 8.8bn to Bermuda, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2013, 7:09 PM), http://www.ft
.com/cms/s/0/89acc832-31cc-11e3-a16d-00144feab7de.html#axzz3lG5CkFWE.
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\65-2\DPL217.txt unknown Seq: 3  2-AUG-16 9:48
2016] LINE DRAWING IN CORPORATE RIGHTS 599
Inc.12  And, in some multinational enterprises and corporate groups, a
corporation might exist as nothing more than a shell, a “special pur-
pose vehicle” created for the purpose of partitioning assets and liabili-
ties or creating a particular regulatory effect.13
The areas of activity of business corporations are also diverse.
Many news and media companies are organized in the corporate form.
The New York Times Company, Fox News Group, and CNN are each
a corporation or are owned by a corporation.  In fact, by 2012, just six
corporations controlled 90% of the media consumed by Americans.14
Some corporations operate in heavily regulated areas, such as banks
and utilities, whereas some operate in areas closely connected to the
government, such as private prison corporations.  Thus, there is signif-
icant variation within the range of business corporations.
Furthermore, from the perspective of organizational structure,
some corporations are barely recognizable as the same species.  By
definition, nonprofit corporations do not have shareholders.15  Many
nonprofits are granted income tax exemption from the federal govern-
ment under Section 501(c) of the Internal Revenue Code.16  Although
nonprofits cannot distribute profits to equity owners, they are state-
chartered corporations that can earn profits for use in operating the
organization, and they can pay salaries and perquisites to employees.17
The nonprofit sector is an “economic powerhouse that employs mil-
lions of people and accounts for a significant portion of the nation’s
gross domestic product.”18
In addition, a social enterprise movement has recently swept across
the states, giving rise to benefit corporations, flexible purpose corpo-
12. Alistair Barr & Rolfe Winkler, Google Creates Parent Company Called Alphabet in Re-
structuring, WALL ST. J., Aug. 10, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/google-creates-new-com-
pany-alphabet-1439240645; Larry Page, G Is for Google, https://abc.xyz/ (last visited Sept. 9,
2015).
13. Thomas E. Plank, The Security of Securitization and the Future of Security, 25 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1655, 1663 (2004); Steven L. Schwarcz, The Alchemy of Asset Securitization, 1 STAN. J.L.
BUS. & FIN. 133, 135 (1994). See generally Comm. on Bankr. & Corp. Reorg. of the Ass’n of the
Bar N.Y.C., Structured Financing Techniques, 50 BUS. LAW. 527, 553–67 (1995) (describing the
role of special purpose vehicles).
14. James B. Stewart, When Media Mergers Limit More than Competition, N.Y. TIMES, July
25, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/26/business/a-21st-century-fox-time-warner-merger-
would-narrow-already-dwindling-competition.html.
15. Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 838, 844 (1980).
16. Usha Rodrigues, Entity and Identity, 60 EMORY L.J. 1257, 1263 (2011). See generally
I.R.C. § 501(c) (2012); BRUCE R. HOPKINS, TAX EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS AND CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW § 1.8 (2012) (discussing the public policy doctrine).
17. Hansmann, supra note 15, at 838.
18. PETER FRUMKIN, ON BEING NONPROFIT: A CONCEPTUAL AND POLICY PRIMER 2 (2002).
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rations, and social purpose corporations.19  Underlying these new
forms is the notion of enabling corporations to pursue “blended
value” and purposes other than shareholder wealth maximization.20
For example, benefit corporation statutes generally require considera-
tion of nonshareholder stakeholders, the community, and pursuit of a
“general public benefit.”21
Despite this vast diversity of corporations, the Supreme Court has
often treated corporations monolithically when determining corporate
rights.  From its earliest decision interpreting Article III diversity ju-
risdiction, in the 1809 case Bank of the United States v. Deveaux,22 to
its 2010 campaign finance decision in Citizens United v. FEC,23 the
Court ruled as to corporations generally.  For example, in Citizens
United, the Court reasoned that it could not decide the case on narrow
grounds as to the nonprofit political advocacy organization at hand
and struck down earlier campaign finance precedent as well as the
provision of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act at issue.24  In doing
so, the Court referred to corporations as “association[s]” and “as-
sociations of citizens,”25 and it explained that “First Amendment pro-
tection extends to corporations26 because “the Government cannot
restrict political speech based on the speaker’s corporate identity.”27
In support of its broad ruling as to all corporations, the Court cited
cases decided in the context of nonprofits and the press.28
When the Court has tried to draw lines between corporations in its
corporate rights determinations, it has often done so in a formalistic,
wooden way. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. is the most recent
19. See J. Haskell Murray, Choose Your Own Master: Social Enterprise, Certifications, and
Benefit Corporation Statutes, 2 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 1, 22–24 (2012); Dana Brakman Reiser, The
Next Big Thing: Flexible Purpose Corporations, 2 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 55, 56 (2012).
20. ANTONY BUGG-LEVINE & JED EMERSON, IMPACT INVESTING: TRANSFORMING HOW WE
MAKE MONEY WHILE MAKING A DIFFERENCE 5–7 (2011) (referring to “blended value” as a mix
of the economic, social, and environmental values that social enterprises produce); Murray,
supra note 19, at 4–9. R
21. See MODEL BENEFIT CORPORATION LEGISLATION §§ 201(a), 301(a) (2014), http://
benefitcorp.net/sites/default/files/documents/Model_Benefit_Corp_Legislation.pdf.
22. 9 U.S. 61 (1809), overruled in part by Louisville, Cincinnati & Charleston R.R. v. Letson,
43 U.S. 497, 529 (1844).
23. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
24. Id. at 320–21, 365–66.
25. Id. at passim.
26. Id. at 342.
27. Id. at 346.
28. Id. at 342 (noting that the “Court has recognized that First Amendment protection ex-
tends to corporations[,]”citing a string of cases involving the press, and explaining that “[t]his
protection has been extended by explicit holdings to the context of political speech” (e.g.,
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963)); Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936)).
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example of this formalistic line drawing.29  The case raised the issue of
whether a business corporation constitutes a “person” that can “exer-
cise religion” under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993
(RFRA).30  The Supreme Court held that RFRA applied to the three
business corporations in the case, allowing them to claim a religious
exemption from providing certain contraceptive coverage to their em-
ployees under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
(ACA).31  In so holding, the Court repeatedly referred to the term
“closely held corporation”32 but provided no definition of the term
and did not acknowledge that there is no singular definition under
corporate law.33  Furthermore, despite the Court’s characterization of
the shareholders as “owners” and “small-business owners,” one of the
corporations in the case, Hobby Lobby, has more than 13,000 employ-
ees, $3.7 billon in sales revenues per year, and over 600 stores nation-
wide.34  The Court did not identify which characteristics of the
corporations were important for reaching its conclusion and instead
left the task of defining eligible organizations to the U.S. Department
of Health and Human Services (HHS) with little guidance besides the
term “closely held corporation.”35
As Hobby Lobby reflects, line drawing in corporate rights determi-
nations is exceedingly difficult.  A natural temptation arises to adopt
lines already drawn in other areas of the law.  Such lines might have
the appeal of convenience or bringing a certain clarity or bright-line
approach because a body of precedent already exists regarding the
categorization.
29. 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2771.
30. Id. at 2759–61. See generally Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-
141, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to bb-4 (2012)).
31. 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2762, 2785.
32. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at passim.
33. Elizabeth Pollman, Corporate Law and Theory in Hobby Lobby, in THE RISE OF CORPO-
RATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 150, 163–64 (Micah Schwartzman et al. eds., 2016).
34. # 118 Hobby Lobby Stores, FORBES, http://www.forbes.com/companies/hobby-lobby-
stores/ (last visited Dec. 18, 2015).  Forbes estimated that Hobby Lobby has 28,000 employees,
whereas the Supreme Court’s opinion stated that it has more than 13,000. See id.; see also
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2765.
35. See Press Release, Administration Takes Steps To Ensure Women’s Continued Access to
Contraception Coverage, While Respecting Religious-Based Objections (Aug. 22, 2014), http://
www.hhs.gov/news/press/2014pres/08/20140822a.html.  In July 2015, the U.S. Departments of La-
bor, Treasury, and HHS published final rules providing for accommodations for closely held
corporations that claim religious objection to providing coverage for some or all of the FDA-
approved contraceptive methods.  Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Afforda-
ble Care Act, 80 Fed. Reg. 41,318 (July 14, 2015) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54; 29 C.F.R.
pts. 2510 and 2590, 45 C.F.R. pt. 147).
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This Article argues that existing lines drawn between corporations
may be a useful starting place for analysis, but caution must be used
because the lines drawn in other areas were done for various policy
reasons in different contexts that may not map onto the corporate
rights determination.  Attention should be paid to the specific charac-
teristics of corporations that are relevant to the right at stake and the
basis for extending protection.  The key contribution of this Article is
to advance the discussion by examining the utility of common lines
that the law has already drawn between corporations: the for-
profit–nonprofit line, the public–private line, and the closely held
category.
This Article, written for 21st Annual Clifford Symposium, proceeds
as follows.  Part II examines the Supreme Court’s corporate rights ju-
risprudence.  First, the Part reviews how the Supreme Court has often
treated corporations monolithically, ruling broadly as to all corpora-
tions or without any special consideration of the party’s status as a
corporation.36  Further, it shows that, with limited exception, when the
Court has tried to draw lines between corporations in rights determi-
nations, it has done so in a formalistic way.37  Second, building on pre-
vious work, Part II makes the case that the Court needs to draw lines
in corporate rights determinations.38  The Court’s derivative and in-
strumental rationales for granting rights to corporations do not sup-
port broad rulings as to all corporations and all rights.39
Part III seeks to advance the debate by critically analyzing the util-
ity of common lines drawn between corporations.40  Specifically, this
Part analyzes the for-profit–nonprofit line, the public–private line,
and the closely held category.  This discussion highlights that these
lines may provide a useful starting point for analysis to the extent that
they roughly correspond with characteristics that are relevant to cor-
porate rights determinations but that these lines may not be a perfect
fit because they were drawn in other areas of the law for different
goals and policy reasons.  A more exacting approach would go beyond
mere terminology to pinpoint the characteristics that are essential to a
determination that extends a right to specific corporations.
36. See infra notes 41–121 and accompanying text. R
37. See infra notes 122–35 and accompanying text. R
38. This Part primarily relies on a recent article, Margaret M. Blair & Elizabeth Pollman, The
Derivative Nature of Corporate Constitutional Rights, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1673 (2015).
39. Id.
40. See infra notes 136–233 and accompanying text. R
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II. MONOLITHIC TREATMENT OR LINE DRAWING?
This Part reviews the Supreme Court’s corporate rights jurispru-
dence with a focus on when the Court has and has not been sensitive
to the differences between corporations.  Although line drawing be-
tween corporations is an extremely challenging task, it is one that
must be done.
A. Supreme Court Corporate Rights Jurisprudence
The Court’s approach to corporate rights has been incremental,
case-by-case over time, starting in the early 1800s.  It is therefore diffi-
cult to generalize its treatment of corporations over two centuries with
precision, but in broad strokes we can observe that the Court has
often shown little regard for drawing distinctions between corpora-
tions and has sometimes relied on cases involving certain types of cor-
porations as precedent in later cases involving the rights of very
different corporations.
The Court’s first case interpreting how a constitutional provision
applies to corporations is Bank of the United States v. Deveaux.41  The
case presented the issue of whether corporations were subject to di-
versity jurisdiction.  Article III, Section 2, Clause 1 of the Constitu-
tion, together with the Judiciary Act of 1789, provides that the federal
courts may hear “cases” or “controversies” between “citizens of dif-
ferent states.”42  The Court held that corporations are not “citizens,”
but that diversity jurisdiction exists when there is complete diversity
between the shareholders of a corporate party and the opposing party.
Appearing before the Court was the first Bank of the United States,
established under an act of Congress in 1791 and unique in many
ways.  The Court, however, did not inquire into the nature of that par-
ticular corporation apart from its focus on the state citizenship of the
corporation’s shareholders.43
In a 1819 case of Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward,44 the
Court held that the corporate charter of Dartmouth College was a
contract within the meaning of the Contracts Clause of the Constitu-
41. 9 U.S. 61 (1809).
42. Id. at 86 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1), overruled in part by Louisville, Cincinnati
& Charleston R.R. v. Letson, 43 U.S. 497 (1844); see also Dudley O. McGovney, A Supreme
Court Fiction: Corporations in the Diverse Citizenship Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 56
HARV. L. REV. 853, 879 (1943) (discussing diversity jurisdiction).
43. Deveaux, 9 U.S. at 87–88 (“Substantially and essentially, the parties in such a case, where
the members of the corporation are aliens, or citizens of a different state from the opposite
party, come within the spirit and terms of the jurisdiction conferred by the constitution on the
national tribunals.”).
44. Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 590 (1819).
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tion.45  At issue was whether the New Hampshire state legislature’s
act to unilaterally change the college’s charter violated the Contracts
Clause.  The Court reasoned that the charter was a contract between
the people who applied for it and the government body that granted
it.46  Furthermore, it was a private contract in nature because the
founder and donors had personally funded the school to promote its
religious and educational aims.47  The Court recognized that because
the college was “eleemosynary,” the donors no longer had a direct
interest in the property, but noted that the corporation stood in their
place to distribute the property as they intended.48  Although
Dartmouth College involved a charitable institution, the Court’s ruling
was understood as extending to all private corporations, including
business corporations.49  Shortly after the decision, business corpora-
tions brought claims under the Contracts Clause.50
When the Court denied constitutional protection to corporations, it
did so holistically as well.  For example, in the 1839 case Bank of Au-
gusta v. Earle,51 the Court ruled that corporations are not “citizens”
for purposes of Article IV’s Privileges and Immunities Clause.52  The
Court rejected Privileges and Immunities Clause claims from any cor-
poration, no matter the type; the right was intended only for individu-
als in their individual capacity.53
45. Id. at 590.
46. Id. at 652–54.
47. See id. at 632–39.
48. See id. at 633–34.
49. Private corporations in this context referred to those that were not municipal corpora-
tions. See, e.g., JOSEPH K. ANGELL & SAMUEL AMES, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE COR-
PORATIONS AGGREGATE § 14 (John Lathrop ed., 9th ed. 1871) (noting that “public” corporation
referred to a municipal corporation that “has for its objects the government of a portion of the
State . . . endowed with a portion of political power”).
50. Stephen A. Siegel, Understanding the Nineteenth Century Contract Clause: The Role of the
Property-Privilege Distinction and “Takings” Clause Jurisprudence, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 3 n.2, 7
(1986) (noting that the Contracts Clause was one of the most frequently litigated constitutional
provisions in the nineteenth century and “[n]early ninety percent of all contract clause cases
involved state-granted franchises, mainly corporate charters”); see, e.g., Providence Bank v. Bill-
ings, 29 U.S. 514, 559–60 (1830) (“It has been settled that a contract entered into between a state
and an individual, is as fully protected by the tenth section of the first article of the constitution,
as a contract between two individuals; and it is not denied that a charter incorporating a bank is
a contract.”).
51. 38 U.S. 519 (1839).
52. Id. at 586–87. The Court reaffirmed Bank of Augusta in Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168,
181–82 (1868), and further held in Pembina Consolidated Silver Mining & Milling Co. v. Penn-
sylvania, 125 U.S. 181, 187 (1888), that corporations are not “citizens” for purposes of the Four-
teenth Amendment’s Privileges and Immunities Clause.
53. Blair & Pollman, supra note 38, at 1684–85 (“The Court distinguished between rights R
granted to corporations because the corporation served as a proxy for its members, shareholders,
or contributors, and rights that were available only to citizens directly.”).
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Later in the nineteenth century, Santa Clara County v. Southern Pa-
cific Railroad54 brought to the Supreme Court the question of whether
a corporation is a “person” within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment.55  The case represented a group of tax cases involving
various railroad corporations, concerning whether a provision of the
California constitution violated the Fourteenth Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution by allowing all taxpayers except “railroads and
other quasi-public corporations” to deduct the value of mortgages
from their property tax assessment.56  Before oral argument, Chief
Justice Waite famously disposed of the railroads’ Fourteenth Amend-
ment claims with the following comment, which was reported in the
headnotes to the opinion:
The Court does not wish to hear argument on the question whether
the provision in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution,
which forbids a State to deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws, applies to these corporations. We
are all of opinion that it does.57
The Court’s opinion took a narrow approach in finding that the tax
assessment against the railroads was void and specifically avoided rul-
ing on the constitutional issue.58
Not long after the Santa Clara decision, however, in Pembina Con-
solidated Silver Mining & Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania,59 the Court re-
ferred back to the case with approval, stating:  “Under the designation
of person [in the Fourteenth Amendment] there is no doubt that a
private corporation is included.  Such corporations are merely associa-
tions of individuals united for a special purpose, and permitted to do
business under a particular name, and have a succession of members
without dissolution.”60  Likewise, in Minneapolis & St. Lewis Railway
v. Beckwith,61 the Court noted that “corporations can invoke the ben-
efits of provisions of the Constitution and laws which guarantee to
persons the enjoyment of property, or afford to them the means for its
protection, or prohibit legislation injuriously affecting it.”62  Notably,
54. 118 U.S. 394 (1886).
55. Id. at 396, 409.
56. Id. at 404, 409.
57. Id. at 396 (opinion of Waite, C.J.).
58. Id. at 411 (“If these positions [regarding tax assessment technicalities] are tenable, there
will be no occasion to consider the grave questions of constitutional law upon which the case was
determined below; for, in that event, the judgment can be affirmed upon the ground that the
assessment cannot properly be the basis of a judgment against the defendant.”).
59. 5 U.S. 181 (1888).
60. Id. at 189.
61. 129 U.S. 26 (1889).
62. Id. at 28.
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regardless of whether the case involved railroads or mining corpora-
tions, the Court was not focused on the nature of the specific corpora-
tion in the case or its characteristics in comparison with other
corporations, but rather spoke in general terms as to all corporations.
As we have seen thus far, by the late nineteenth century, the Court
had recognized corporations as having limited constitutional protec-
tions related to corporate property and contracts, with a view toward
protecting the persons involved in the corporation.63  The Court dis-
tinguished between the types of rights that corporations could appro-
priately be understood to hold, but not between corporations, other
than those that were governmental in nature, such as municipal
corporations.
The early twentieth century brought cases concerning a new area of
corporate rights before the Court: criminal liability and related pro-
tections concerning trials and searches.  Again, the Court treated cor-
porations as a group.
In a 1909 case, New York Central & Hudson River Railroad Co. v.
United States,64 the Supreme Court, speaking broadly in terms of cor-
porations, held that corporations could be subject to criminal liability
for acts committed by agents.65  Similarly, Hale v. Henkel,66 decided
by the Court in 1906, held that corporations have Fourth Amendment
protections against unreasonable searches and seizures but may not
claim the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.67
The Court distinguished between the rights that corporations could
claim but not between types of corporations.  For example, the Court
explained that the Fourth Amendment extended to corporations be-
cause “[a] corporation is, after all, but an association of individuals
under an assumed name and with a distinct legal entity” and that “[i]n
organizing itself as a collective body it waives no constitutional immu-
63. The Court’s ruling on the Fourteenth Amendment in the nineteenth century arose in the
context of the property rights of corporations; around this time, the Court parsed the Fourteenth
Amendment in a way that reflects that understanding. Ruth H. Bloch & Naomi R. Lamoreaux,
Corporations and the Fourteenth Amendment, (manuscript at 17–19, 23–27); see, e.g., Nw. Nat’l
Life Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 203 U.S. 243, 255 (1906) (noting that the liberty protected by the Four-
teenth Amendment “is the liberty of natural, not artificial persons”).
64. 212 U.S. 481 (1909).
65. Id. at 494–95 (“[W]e see no good reason why corporations may not be held responsible for
and charged with the knowledge and purposes of their agents, acting within the authority con-
ferred up on them.”).
66. 201 U.S. 43 (1906), overruled in part by Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n of N.Y. Harbor,
378 U.S. 52 (1964).
67. Id. at 71–77.
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nities appropriate to such body.”68  But corporations do not have a
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination because that
protection is designed to be “purely a personal privilege of the wit-
ness.”69  The Court has rigidly adhered to this conception of the privi-
lege, even later holding that “a corporation’s records custodian may
not claim a Fifth Amendment privilege no matter how small the cor-
poration may be.”70  This means that a sole proprietor may claim the
privilege against self-incrimination in response to a subpoena for busi-
ness documents but could not do so if she operated the same business
through the corporate form.71
Before the 1970s, only a handful of cases raised questions regarding
the First Amendment protections for corporations and they involved
nonprofit membership associations and the press.  These cases repre-
sented a significant shift in the Court’s corporate rights jurisprudence
in that they moved beyond questions of contract and property rights
and those related to corporate criminal liability.  However, these cases
were also quite narrow because they involved a particular type of cor-
poration related to the First Amendment interest at stake.  For exam-
ple, the Court held that a state license tax imposed on newspaper
corporations selling advertising was an impermissible abridgment of
speech or of the press.72  During the Civil Rights Era, the NAACP
was recognized as having a right to refuse to reveal its membership list
to protect the freedom of association of its individual members.73
These cases did not focus on the corporate nature of the parties or
whether they implied rights for other types of corporations.
68. Id. at 76.  The Court did create exceptions to Fourth Amendment protections against war-
rantless regulatory searches in the case of certain industries, such as liquor and firearms. See,
e.g., Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981) (“[A] warrant may not be constitutionally required
when Congress has reasonably determined that warrantless searches are necessary to further a
regulatory scheme . . . . ”); Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978) (discussing exeptions
for pervasively regulated businesses and holding that a warrant is required for OSHA inspec-
tions unless there is consent).
69. Hale, 201 U.S. at 69.  “The amendment is limited to a person who shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself, and if he cannot set up the privilege of a third
person, he certainly cannot set up the privilege of a corporation.” Id. at 70.
70. Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 102 (1988) (discussing Bellis v. United States, 417
U.S. 85 (1974) and the collective entity rule); see also Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361,
384–85 (1911) (holding that a corporate officer cannot resist a subpoena for corporate records by
invoking his personal privilege).
71. Braswell, 487 U.S. at 104.
72. Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250–51 (1936).
73. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428 (1963) (validating the NAACP’s claim that a state
statutory ban on improper solicitation of legal business abridged “the freedoms of the First
Amendment, protected against state action by the Fourteenth”); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel.
Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 466 (1958).
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In freedom of association cases that have followed, although the
Court has never explicitly distinguished expressive associations from
business corporations, this dichotomy has become commonly accepted
through concurring opinions and lower court interpretations.74  For
example, in Roberts v. United States Jaycees,75 which concerned an all-
male organization’s challenge to a state antidiscrimination law, Justice
O’Connor concurred with the majority, holding that admitting women
into the organization would not significantly undermine the group’s
expressive message.76  She wrote separately to argue that, in any
event, the all-male organization was entitled to only “minimal consti-
tutional protection” as a predominantly commercial organization.77  A
few years later in New York State Club Association v. City of New
York,78 Justice O’Connor again wrote that the right to freedom of as-
sociation should vary according to the nature of the organization.79
Although this dichotomy was not at issue in Boy Scouts of America v.
Dale,80 the Court implicitly suggested that it viewed the associational
interests of expressive associations, like the Boy Scouts, differently
from commercial organizations.81
Since the 1970s, the Supreme Court has significantly expanded
these earlier, limited First Amendment rulings.  Through two primary
moves, the Court interpreted the First Amendment as protecting cor-
porate speech and political spending.  First, the Court added another
rationale underlying its corporate rights logic. The Court had previ-
ously used a variety of approaches in its corporate rights decisions but
had an underlying logic of corporate rights as derivative of the natural
persons represented by the corporation.82  Starting in the 1970s, the
Court began additionally relying on an instrumental rationale to ac-
cord rights to corporations when doing so would protect the interests
of persons outside of the corporation—listeners.  Second, the Court
relied on cases involving nonprofits and the press, and characteriza-
74. James D. Nelson, The Freedom of Business Association, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 461, 464–68
(2015); see also Dale Carpenter, Expressive Association and Anti-Discrimination Law After Dale:
A Tripartite Approach, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1515, 1564–66 (2001) (discussing Roberts v. U.S.
Jaycees, 468 U.S. 627 (1984)); Laurence H. Tribe, Disentangling Symmetries: Speech, Association,
Parenthood, 28 PEPP. L. REV. 641, 657–58 (2001).
75. 468 U.S. 609.
76. Id. at 627 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
77. Id. at 635 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
78. 487 U.S. 1 (1988).
79. Id. at 18 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
80. 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
81. Id. at 657.
82. Blair & Pollman, supra note 38, at 1731–38. R
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tions of business corporations as associations to broaden First Amend-
ment rulings to corporations generally.
Regarding the instrumental basis for corporate rights, the Court
first turned to this new rationale in establishing commercial speech
rights.  In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Con-
sumer Council, Inc.,83 the Court held that advertising is within the
scope of First Amendment protection because of consumers’ interest
in the free flow of commercial information.84  Consumer advocates
brought the case, challenging an advertising ban that prohibited phar-
macists from advertising drug prices.  The Court’s ruling relied on the
idea that these consumers had a right to hear the information and that
suppression of truthful speech about lawful activity could hurt con-
sumers’ ability to make informed decisions.85  This case, and the com-
mercial speech cases that followed,86 were not based on a view of
corporations having personhood and speech interests, but rather were
focused on protecting speech for listeners.87
The Court’s jurisprudence on corporate political spending came
shortly on the heels of the Virginia Pharmacy commercial speech case
and its landmark decision in Buckley v. Valeo,88 which interpreted the
First Amendment as a limit on campaign finance regulation.89  In First
National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,90 the Court struck down a state
statute that prohibited banks and corporations from spending money
to influence referendum ballot initiatives.91  The Court held that the
statute “abridge[d] expression that the First Amendment was meant
to protect[,]” and the corporate identity of the speaker did not deprive
the speech its protections.92  This rationale harkened back to Virginia
Pharmacy and its instrumental rationale.93
83. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
84. Id. at 764.
85. Id. at 753–54.
86. See, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557
(1980).
87. See Adam Winkler, Corporate Personhood and the Rights of Corporate Speech, 30
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 863, 867 (2007).
88. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam), superseded by statute, Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81, as recognized in McConnell v. Fed. Election. Comm’n,
540 U.S. 93 (2003).
89. Id. at 58–59.
90. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
91. Id. at 767, 776.
92. See id. at 776.
93. Id. at 783 (“[Our recent commercial speech cases] illustrate that the First Amendment
goes beyond protection of the press and the self-expression of individuals to prohibit govern-
ment from limiting the stock of information from which members of the public may draw.”).
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Furthermore, the Court relied on Santa Clara County and prece-
dents regarding the speech rights of the press and media corporations
to grant speech rights to corporations broadly.  Citing a string of press
and media cases, the Court reasoned that free speech is a liberty right
safeguarded by the Due Process Clause, and “the Court has not iden-
tified a separate source for the right when it has been asserted by cor-
porations.”94  Additionally, in a footnote, the Court cited Santa Clara
County for the proposition that “[i]t has been settled for almost a cen-
tury that corporations are persons within the meaning of the Four-
teenth Amendment.”95
After Bellotti, the Court stepped back from corporate free speech
protections in several decisions and a framework of campaign finance
lines were drawn.  In Federal Election Commission v. Massachusetts
Citizens for Life, Inc. (MCFL),96 the Court suggested, in dicta, that
restrictions on corporate political spending might be constitutional.97
The case involved a challenge brought by a nonprofit, ideological
membership corporation (MCFL) to the constitutionality of a provi-
sion of the Federal Election Campaign Act, which prohibited corpora-
tions from using general fund dollars for expenditures “in connection
with” federal candidate elections.98  The provision required corpora-
tions to instead use the separately segregated funds of political action
committees (PACs) to make expenditures.99  The membership corpo-
ration had used general funds to publish a newsletter that identified
pro-life candidates.100
The Court ruled that the statutory provision was unconstitutional as
applied to MCFL for three reasons, which effectively created a test or
line drawn between corporations based on specific characteristics re-
lated to the right at stake.  First, MCFL “was formed for the express
purpose of promoting political ideas, and [could not] engage in busi-
ness activities.”101  Second, MCFL had no shareholders, and the peo-
ple involved with the organization had no economic reason to remain
affiliated if they disagreed with its political activity.102  Third, MCFL’s
only source of funds was member contributions from people who sup-
94. Id. at 780.
95. Id. at 780 n.15 (citing Santa Clara Cty. v. S. Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394 (1896)).
96. 479 U.S. 238 (1986).
97. Id. at 254 n.7.
98. MCFL, 479 U.S. at 238.
99. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2)(C) (2000), declared unconstitutional by Citizens United v. Fed. Elec-
tion Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
100. MCFL, 479 U.S. at 243–44.
101. Id. at 264.
102. Id.
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ported its political activities and it did not act as a conduit for for-
profit corporate electoral spending.103  The Court referred to these
characteristics as “essential” to its holding.104  And, by contrast, it sug-
gested that Congress could constitutionally restrict the corporate po-
litical spending of business corporations because they have “legal
advantages enhancing their ability to accumulate wealth,” which give
them an “unfair advantage” for their political speech.105  Thus, MCFL
carved out an exemption to the general prohibition on a corporation’s
use of general treasury funds for independent expenditures, and it was
tailored to the type of corporation that implicates First Amendment
values and could support a derivative right for the corporation.
Until Citizens United, the MCFL exemption stood as a line drawn
in the Court’s corporate political spending jurisprudence.  This juris-
prudence, however, became increasingly in tension with itself as the
Bellotti reasoning, which disregarded the corporate identity of the
speaker, was undermined without being overruled.  In three subse-
quent decisions, the Court held that corporations could be banned
from using general funds for independent political expenditures, con-
tributions to candidates, and electioneering communications.106  For
example, in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce,107 the Court
upheld a ban on corporations using general treasury funds to make
independent expenditures in elections, recognizing that the state had a
compelling interest in preventing the “corrosive and distorting ef-
fects” of corporate political spending.108  The Court considered the
“special advantages” that corporations receive under state law, which
allow them to use “‘resources amassed in the economic marketplace’
to obtain ‘an unfair advantage in the political marketplace.’”109 Bel-
lotti’s categorical reasoning, which paid no attention to corporate
103. See id.
104. Id. at 263–64.
105. Id. at 257, 258 n.11.
106. See Fed. Election Comm’n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 149 (2003); McConnell v. Fed.
Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 105 (2003), overruled by Citizens United v. Fed. Election
Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 668–69
(1990), overruled by Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310.
107. 494 U.S. 652 (1990), overruled by Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310.
108. See id. at 659–60.
109. Id. at 658–59 (quoting Fed. Election Comm’n v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S.
238, 257 (1986)).  In Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., the Court
stepped slightly back from this line of cases and returned to a focus on the speech rather than
speaker.  551 U.S. 449 (2007).  The Court recognized that earlier decisions had found an antidis-
tortion interest supporting the limiting of corporate speech but ruled such an interest was appli-
cable only to campaign speech (express advocacy and its “functional equivalent”) and not issue
advocacy. Id. at 481–82.
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identity, had left little room for these more nuanced approaches to
corporate political spending.
With its expansive ruling as to all corporations, Citizens United re-
solved this tension in campaign finance jurisprudence by tearing down
the MCFL line and the original framework of corporations using
PACs and overruling earlier campaign finance precedent, such as Aus-
tin.  In Citizens United, the Court held that corporations of all types
can spend unlimited amounts of corporate treasury money on inde-
pendent political expenditures.110  Thus, the Court returned to a mon-
olithic treatment of corporations.
In concluding that it could not rule narrowly as to Citizens United,
which was the nonprofit political advocacy organization at hand, the
Court heavily relied on Bellotti and its notion that “the Government
cannot restrict political speech based on the speaker’s corporate iden-
tity.”111  In doing so, the Court overlooked the distinctions between
different corporations, referring generally to corporations as “associa-
tion[s]” and “associations of citizens”112 as well as citing cases decided
in the context of the press and nonprofits in the civil rights movement
in support of its broad grant of First Amendment protection to all
corporations.113
Following Citizens United, the Court had another recent opportu-
nity to determine the scope of corporate rights. Hobby Lobby raised
the question of whether for-profit business corporations could claim
religious liberty protections under RFRA.114  Although the Court
based its decision on statutory grounds, rather than the First Amend-
ment,115 it nonetheless represented a significant expansion of corpo-
rate rights.  For the first time, the Court allowed business corporations
to opt out of generally applicable federal regulation on the basis of the
religious beliefs of shareholders.  Specifically, the Court held that the
contraceptive coverage requirement under the ACA violated RFRA
as applied to three business corporations, each of which had share-
holders from a single family with sincerely held beliefs.116
Instead of drawing a line focused on the specific characteristics of
the corporations and the derivative nature of the right, as the Court
110. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 365–66.
111. See id. at 346.
112. Id. at passim.
113. Id. at 342.
114. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2579 (2014).
115. Id. at 2785 (“The contraceptive mandate, as applied to closely held corporations, violates
RFRA.  Our decision on that statutory question makes it unnecessary to reach the First Amend-
ment claim raised by Conestoga and the Hahns.”).
116. See id.
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did in MCFL, the Hobby Lobby majority opinion woodenly relied on
the term “closely held” and provided little guidance on how to imple-
ment and limit this landmark ruling.117  For instance, the Court
neither discussed the relevance of the family-owned nature of the bus-
iness corporations in the case nor provided a definition of the term
“closely held.”
Moreover, the Court’s conclusion that “[t]he contraceptive man-
date, as applied to closely held corporations, violates RFRA,”118 sug-
gested a line was drawn, but in fact the Court had not ruled out the
possibility that a public corporation could assert a RFRA claim.  In-
stead, the Court noted that Hobby Lobby did not involve publicly
traded corporations and that it was “unlikely” that these “corporate
giants” would “often” assert RFRA claims.119  The Court’s reasoning
suggests that it relied on the shareholders’ unanimity of religious be-
lief in extending RFRA protection, but the Court’s treatment of cor-
porate law left this point unclear.  Elsewhere in the opinion, the Court
pointed to state corporate law as the mechanism for resolving disputes
among corporate participants,120 but it did not specifically identify
which rules or corporate participants were relevant for establishing
RFRA protection for business corporations.121
B. The Need for Line Drawing in Corporate Rights Determinations
From the period of its earliest jurisprudence, the Court has recog-
nized that corporations are not the same as individual persons and
that their constitutional protections should not be co-extensive in
scope with individual persons.  When people form a corporation, they
create a separate entity under the law with its own existence.122  Yet,
as forms of organizing human enterprise, corporations have natural
117. Pollman, supra note 33, at 150. R
118. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2785.
119. Id. at 2774.
120. Id. at 2775 (stating that “the owners of a company might well have a dispute relating to
religion” but disposing of this concern by noting that “[s]tate corporate law provides a ready
means for resolving any conflicts by, for example, dictating how a corporation can establish its
governing structure”).
121. Pollman, supra note 33, at 165–67. R
122. Margaret M. Blair, Locking in Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for Business Or-
ganizers in the Nineteenth Century, 51 UCLA L. REV. 387, 423–24 (2003); Henry Hansmann &
Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110 YALE L.J. 387, 392–93 (2000);
Leo E. Strine, Jr. & Nicholas Walter, Originalist or Original: The Difficulties of Reconciling Citi-
zens United with Corporate Law History 17 (Harvard John M. Olin Discussion Paper Series,
Paper No. 812, 2015), http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/papers/pdf/Strine_812
.pdf (“A business corporation is not simply ‘individual men and women’: it is a distinct entity
that is legally separate from its stockholders, managers and creditors.  This is the whole point of
corporate law after all . . . .”).
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persons involved in them, and sometimes it is necessary to grant pro-
tection to the corporation to protect the interests of natural persons.
The Court has long recognized this principle, extending certain consti-
tutional protections to corporations.
Therefore, the focus of the debate regarding corporate rights should
be on finding the appropriate scope of protection for corporations to
serve the purpose of the right at stake and the interests of natural
persons.123  The Court has a history of attempting to do just that; it
has denied rights to corporations when it is the type of right that can
be held only in an individual capacity, and it has focused on protecting
natural persons when extending rights to corporations.  In doing so,
however, the Court has often based the extension of protections on a
view of corporations as associations of persons.124  According to the
Court’s logic, the corporation derivatively holds the right to protect
natural persons that have associated through the corporate form.125
As Margaret Blair and I have argued elsewhere, this associational
view of corporations became increasingly problematic over the course
of the nineteenth century.126  By the early twentieth century, modern
business corporations had emerged that could no longer be fairly
characterized as an identifiable group of people acting in associa-
tion.127  Corporations of unprecedented size emerged, with business
spanning the country and even globe, publicly traded stock on na-
tional exchanges, professional managers, and branding that identified
the corporation as a distinct entity separate from the business people
who were involved in the corporation.128  State corporate laws had
liberalized to permit corporations to hold stock in other corporations
and to enter into fundamental transactions with majority, rather than
unanimous, shareholder approval.129  Shareholders were more likely
123. See Elizabeth Pollman, Reconceiving Corporate Personhood, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 1629,
1631 (arguing that “[t]he Court should consider the purpose of the constitutional right at issue,
and whether it would promote the objectives of that right to provide it to the corporation[,]”
with an understanding of the realities and dynamics of different types of business organizations).
124. Blair & Pollman, supra note 38, at 1683. R
125. Id.
126. See id. at 1697–1708.
127. Id. at 1708–12; see also PETER A. FRENCH, COLLECTIVE AND CORPORATE RESPONSIBIL-
ITY 19–30 (1984) (discussing how some corporations “cannot be identified with the aggregation
of the persons who are associated with [them]”); Strine & Walter, supra note 122, at 17 n.74 R
(“Corporations have perpetual existence, are not owned by anyone (stockholders own shares
with certain legal rights, not pieces of the corporation), and have a separate legal existence from
the stockholders, managers, and creditors. . . .  Indeed, it is a stretch to say the modern corpora-
tion is an association of individuals, given that most stock is held by institutional investors.”).
128. Blair & Pollman, supra note 38, at 1707–08. R
129. Blair & Pollman, supra note 38, at 1707; see HARLAND N. PRECHEL, BIG BUSINESS AND R
THE STATE 32 (2000) (discussing liberalization of New Jersey corporate laws); Morton J. Hor-
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to be passive investors, or even indirect shareholders through another
institution, rather than participants in a “corporate democracy.”
The expanded spectrum of organizations using the corporate form
meant that the derivative rights logic no longer applied to all corpora-
tions.130  Some corporations no longer represented an identifiable
group of natural persons acting in association and for whom it would
be necessary to grant the corporation a right to protect their interests.
In some corporations, for example, no natural person’s “autonomy,
dignity, or political equality” is at stake when the corporation makes a
political expenditure.131
Thus, it became imperative for the Court to draw lines between cor-
porations because its derivative rights logic did not support broad rul-
ings as to all corporations.  Few people would argue that ExxonMobil
or the Coca-Cola Company are expressive associations of citizens
coming together to engage in political speech; however, in Citizens
United, the Court referred to corporations generally as “associations
of citizens” rather than acknowledge the meaningful differences be-
tween corporations.  Allowing all corporations to spend general trea-
sury funds on political independent expenditures, as Citizens United
did, is unnecessary to protect the First Amendment interests of the
corporate participants and impairs the integrity of the electoral
process.132
The issue of line drawing has become more important over time as
the Court has had to address issues of corporate rights in the context
of speech, politics, and religion.  The Court has turned to another ra-
tionale besides the derivative rights framework—an instrumental ba-
sis focused on the interests of listeners when speech is involved.133
Line drawing is no less important in this context.  No instrumental
basis exists for protecting the speech of ordinary business corporations
witz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory, 88 W. VA. L. REV. 173,
201–03 (1985); Naomi R. Lamoreaux, Partnerships, Corporations, and the Limits on Contractual
Freedom in U.S. History: An Essay in Economics, Law, and Culture, in CONSTRUCTING CORPO-
RATE AMERICA: HISTORY, POLITICS, AND CULTURE 29, 48 (Kenneth Lipartito & David B. Sicilia
eds., 2004).
130. Blair & Pollman, supra note 38, at 1732. R
131. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 467 (2009) (Stevens, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that the term corporation includes entities for
which it is not clear who is speaking when they place a political advertisement, and that taking
away their ability to do this would impinge upon “no one’s autonomy, dignity, or political
equality”).
132. See ROBERT C. POST, CITIZENS DIVIDED: CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM AND THE CON-
STITUTION 68–75 (2014); Rebecca L. Brown & Andrew D. Martin, ‘Rhetoric and Reality’: Testing
the Harm of Campaign Spending, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1066, 1069–70 (2015).
133. Blair & Pollman, supra note 38, at 1735–37. R
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apart from their ability to provide useful information that promotes
informed decision making; their speech may be regulated to provide
such a value to listeners.134  Furthermore, the fact that they have no
original or derivative basis for speech rights suggests that the govern-
ment should have the ability to regulate speech with less than a com-
pelling interest.135
In sum, the vast diversity of corporations necessitates line drawing
in corporate rights determinations.  Even the Court’s own underlying
logic of derivative and instrumental rights for corporations fails to
support monolithic treatment.
III. UNDERSTANDING COMMON LINES DRAWN
BETWEEN CORPORATIONS
When attempting to distinguish between the wide variety of corpo-
rations, one approach in corporate rights decisions is to adopt, or refer
to, lines already drawn in the law.  This Part examines the most salient
lines that the law has drawn between corporations: the for-
profit–nonprofit line, the public–private line, and the closely held cat-
egory of corporations.  The aim is to provide, in a collected fashion,
critical information for better understanding these distinctions be-
tween corporations.
Furthermore, this Part suggests that although existing lines drawn
between corporations may be a useful starting point for rights analy-
sis, caution should be used.  An existing line drawn between corpora-
tions is likely a rough proxy, at best, for the characteristics relevant to
granting or denying a constitutional or statutory protection.136  This is
because policy rationales that are different from those underpinning
corporate rights determinations have influenced the existing lines be-
tween corporations.  The following discussion highlights that the for-
profit–nonprofit line grew out of the historical practice of state legisla-
tures to provide separate incorporation statutes depending on the ac-
tivities and motives of the incorporators.137  Congress enshrined this
division in the tax code, and it was categorized by the Internal Reve-
nue Service under the narrower moniker of tax-exempt organizations.
134. See POST, supra note 132, at 72–74. R
135. See id. at 74 (“Because restrictions on the speech of ordinary commercial corporations
potentially impair only the circulation of possibly valuable information, courts should allow the
state to regulate such speech on the basis of less pressing interests.”); Blair & Pollman, supra
note 38, at 1737, 1737 n.310. R
136. For an argument that the existing for-profit–nonprofit distinction is a reasonable proxy
for the values relevant to the First Amendment freedom of association, see James D. Nelson,
The Freedom of Business Association, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 461 (2015).
137. See infra Part III.A.
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No clearly formulated rationale explains the special treatment of all of
these organizations.  The public–private line was developed by federal
securities laws primarily with the goal of investor protection.  The
closely held category developed in state corporate law to address con-
flicts between shareholders, such as the oppression of minority share-
holders, in corporations in which these shareholders had little or no
liquidity in their stock.
In addition, besides being aimed at different goals than those that
might be at stake in any particular corporate rights determination, the
existing lines between corporations are often imprecise and subject to
change.  For example, as noted below, Congress has recently redrawn
the public–private line through changes to securities laws.138  With this
overview, we can now turn to examining the various lines drawn by
the law between corporations.
A. The For-Profit–Nonprofit Line
The category of nonprofit corporations is diverse, including: (1)
churches and religious organizations; (2) “commercial” providers of
goods and services, such as hospitals and automobile associations; (3)
donative organizations, such as private or independent foundations
and public charities; (4) trade associations and social clubs, such as
chambers of commerce as well as fraternities and sororities; and (5)
hybrid organizations that combine functions, such as universities.139
Some nonprofit corporations operate without government funding,
such as religious congregations and private membership organizations,
whereas others, such as those serving the elderly and poor, often re-
ceive an important part of their funding from federal, state, and local
governments.140
To understand the for-profit–nonprofit line and how this vast as-
sortment of organizations became more broadly known as nonprofit
corporations, it is best to look at the history of corporations in the
United States.  The line emerged over time, intersected with tax law
and policy, and has come to be distinguished simply by its hallmark
characteristic of the nondistribution constraint.141
138. See infra Part III.B.
139. For a discussion of the range of nonprofit corporations, see FRUMKIN, supra note 18, at 2; R
Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 837, 840–42 (1980);
and Rodrigues, supra note 16, at 1263. R
140. See FRUMKIN, supra note 18, at 2. R
141. Nonprofits are usually structured as corporations.  Hansmann, supra note 139, at 838 R
(“Most nonprofits of any significance are incorporated.”); Dana Brakman Reiser, Charity Law’s
Essentials, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 6 n.6 (2011) (“Although a nonprofit organization may
take the legal form of a charitable trust or an unincorporated association, most U.S. nonprofits
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Since the founding of the United States, states provided charters to
incorporate private associations and businesses that performed impor-
tant public purposes and services.142  During this early period, the
concept of a “nonprofit” did not exist; early corporations were “mixed
public–private” entities.143  Before the mid-nineteenth century, many
state legislatures granted charters only by a special act on an individ-
ual basis.144  As a special government privilege or concession, states
mainly awarded charters for enterprises that would benefit the public
good, such as supplying public transport or building public works.145
In addition to requiring a special charter, states also subjected corpo-
rations to various limitations, such as restricting corporate action to
formal, delineated powers specified in the charter.146  Thus, during
this period, corporations were organized with a quasi-public function
and were understood to be subject to strict government limitations.
According to historian Jonathan Levy, “[o]nly in the latter half of
the nineteenth century did anything like a private for profit / nonprofit
binary take shape.”147  This began with the spread of state general
incorporation acts, which opened access to corporate charters without
the need for a special legislative act.  For example, the New York leg-
islature passed piecemeal statutes for educational institutions, librar-
ies, agricultural societies, medical societies, and Bible and common
prayer groups, then, in 1848, it passed a general incorporation statute
for all classes of charitable organizations to receive a corporate char-
are formed as nonprofit corporations.”); see Garry W. Jenkins, Incorporation Choice, Uniform-
ity, and the Reform of Nonprofit State Law, 41 GA. L. REV. 1113, 1124–25 (2007) (noting that
“most nonprofit entities are structured as nonprofit corporations” and “[j]ust like their for-profit
counterparts, nonprofit corporations may choose their state of incorporation”).
142. RONALD E. SEAVOY, THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN BUSINESS CORPORATION
1784–1855, at 255 (1982).  For a discussion of corporations in early America, see also LAWRENCE
M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 120–39 (3d ed. 2005); JAMES WILLARD HURST,
THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
1780–1970, at 8–9, 13–14 (1970).
143. Levy, supra note 11 (manuscript at 7); see also Gregory A. Mark, The Court and the R
Corporation: Jurisprudence, Localism, and Federalism, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 403, 413 (“[E]arly
business corporations were essentially utilities—road and canal companies, for example—or
business entities with similar characteristics—banks and insurance companies.  The usual under-
standing has been that almost all business corporations were thus, to borrow a phrase of later
importance, businesses affected with the public interest.”); id. at 417 (“While distinctions were
drawn between the law governing public and private corporations, they were fewer and nar-
rower than one might expect.  Those drawn between charitable and business corporations were
almost nonexistent.”).
144. HURST, supra note 142, at 15. R
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Levy, supra note 11 (manuscript at 7). R
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ter.148  States also passed general incorporation statutes for business
corporations and began to allow businesses to incorporate for purely
commercial purposes, such as manufacturing.149  These different gen-
eral incorporation statutes evidenced the for-profit–nonprofit dichot-
omy that began to take shape.
Pennsylvania’s general incorporation law, passed in 1874, intro-
duced the language of “not for profit” corporations.150  The statute
divided corporations into three categories: (1) religious corporations
that received property tax exemption; (2) taxable “for profit” corpora-
tions; and (3) tax-exempt “not for profit” corporations.151  The “not
for profit” corporations were determined by whether the individual
incorporators had a profit motive.152  This general incorporation act
was passed at the urging of the Pennsylvania Railroad, which did not
want to be circumscribed in its activities as a “railroad corporation”
and preferred to be a “for profit” corporation liberated to pursue
wider business activity.153  During this era, states began to allow busi-
ness corporations to pursue any lawful business,154 and “not for
profit” corporations were defined by contradistinction when incorpo-
rators lacked a profit motive or had an altruistic motive.155
This dichotomy was incorporated into the Internal Revenue Code
when the Revenue Act of 1894 exempted from taxation “corpora-
tions, companies, or associations organized and conducted solely for
charitable, religious, or educational purposes.”156  The 1909 Corporate
Excise Tax Act incorporated the tax exemption and added the non-
profit concept to the specification of purposes, exempting “any corpo-
ration or association organized and operated exclusively for religious,
charitable, or educational purposes, no part of the net income of
which inures to the benefit of any private stockholder or individ-
148. James J. Fishman, The Development of Nonprofit Corporation Law and an Agenda for
Reform, 34 EMORY L.J. 617, 633–34 (1985).  By the late nineteenth century, the New York legis-
lature had enacted separate corporate law statutes for general corporations and membership
corporations, which consolidated the laws for charitable corporations. Id. at 635.
149. See HURST, supra note 142, at 37. R
150. Levy, supra note 11 (manuscript at 9). R
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Susan Pace Hamill, From Special Privilege to General Utility: A Continuation of Willard
Hurst’s Study of Corporations, 49 AM. U. L. REV. 81, 106 n.97 (1999).
155. Levy, supra note 11 (manuscript at 10–11). R
156. Revenue Act of 1894 (Wilson-Gorman Tariff of 1894), ch. 349, § 32, 28 Stat. 509, 556; see
also Boris I. Bittker & George K. Rahdert, The Exemption of Nonprofit Organizations from
Federal Income Taxation, 85 YALE LJ. 299, 302–03 (1976).
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ual.”157  Scholars have noted that “neither upon their initial enact-
ment nor during the ensuing decades have these exemptions elicited
more than cursory legislative explanation, save for matters of techni-
cal detail.”158
Congress overhauled the tax code in 1954 and established the mod-
ern framework of granting tax exemptions to nonprofit corporations
listed in Section 501(c) of the Internal Revenue Code.159  No clear
formulation exists regarding why special treatment is granted to these
organizations.160  A number of grounds have been cited, including his-
tory, morality, politics, and public policy.161
As of 2015, there are twenty-nine different 501(c) classifications
under the tax code.162  The benefits of registering for a 501(c) classifi-
cation are that “the organization pays no federal tax on income [for]
activities related to its central purpose,” and it often receives exemp-
tion from state taxes as well.163  One of the main divisions is between
those serving the public and those serving members.164  The public-
serving nonprofits fall under Section 501(c)(3), which grants an in-
come tax exemption for the corporation as well as tax deductions for
157. Corporation Excise Tax Act of 1909, ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 112, 113; see also Fishman, supra
note 148, at 638 n.113 (discussing the “private inurement proscription” established in the Corpo- R
rate Excise Tax Act).  This exemption language was incorporated in the Revenue Act of 1913,
which permanently established a federal income tax.  Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, § 2(G), 38
Stat. 114, 172; Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 156, at 301. R
158. Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 156, at 301–02 (“Perhaps because the distinction between R
profitmaking corporations and nonprofit institutions was thought obvious, Congress devoted lit-
tle discussion to a separate section of the Act exempting various charitable, religious, educa-
tional, and fraternal benefit organizations from income taxation.”); see also MARION R.
FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 377–78 (2004) (“The fact that the
federal role has evolved within the tax policing system is a matter of historical accident rather
than a conscious assignment of responsibility to the tax authorities.”).
159. Levy, supra note 11 (manuscript at 13). R
160. Hansmann, supra note 139, at 836–37 (“Large classes of nonprofits receive special treat- R
ment in almost all areas in which federal legislation impinges upon them significantly, including
corporate income taxation, Social Security, unemployment insurance, the minimum wage, secur-
ities regulation, bankruptcy, antitrust, unfair competition, copyright, and postal rates.  Yet the
principles on which such special treatment is based are nowhere clearly formulated.” (footnotes
omitted)); see also Eric M. Zolt, Tax Deductions for Charitable Contributions: Domestic Activi-
ties, Foreign Activities, or None of the Above, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 361, 381, 399, 401–04 (2012)
(discussing the inadequacies in theories justifying tax benefits for charitable activities).
161. Fishman, supra note 148, at 637–38; Historical Development and Present Law of the Fed- R
eral Tax Exemption for Charities and Other Tax-Exempt Organizations: Hearing Before the H.
Comm. on Ways & Means, 109th Cong. 27–30 (2005), http://www.jct.gov/x-29-05.pdf.
162. I.R.C. § 501(c) (2012).
163. Rodrigues, supra note 16, at 1263; see also Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 156, at 316–30 R
(discussing the tax on unrelated business income and other limitations).
164. FRUMKIN, supra note 18, at 8. R
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donors.165  Section 501(c) also lists many noncharitable classes of tax-
exempt organizations, such as trade associations, credit unions, busi-
ness leagues, service clubs, veterans’ organizations, and social clubs.166
Another distinction is between the level of restrictions on political ac-
tivity.  For example, Section 501(c)(3) limits the amount of lobbying
the organization can engage in and prohibits the organization from
participating or intervening in political campaigns for or against any
candidate for public office.167  By contrast, Section 501(c)(4) allows an
organization to lobby and electioneer as long as electioneering is not
the organization’s primary purpose or activity.168
But, even with its numerous categorizations and rules, the tax code
does not provide the universal definition or dividing line for nonprof-
its; in fact, not all nonprofits are tax-exempt organizations.169  Some
clubs, associations, and groups have never been formally registered
with the Internal Revenue Service.170  Yet each state has its own sepa-
rate nonprofit corporation statute that is a modern day version of the
old general incorporation statutes, and so the organization could exist
as a nonprofit corporation.171
Although there is not a singular definition of a nonprofit corpora-
tion, there is a hallmark characteristic of this form: the nondistribution
constraint.172  As Professor Henry Hansmann explained: “A nonprofit
organization is, in essence, an organization that is barred from distrib-
uting its net earnings, if any, to individuals who exercise control over
it, such as members, officers, directors, or trustees.”173  That is, the
165. FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 158, at 58; FRUMKIN, supra note 18, at 8; Rodrigues, supra R
note 16, at 1263. R
166. FRUMKIN, supra note 18, at 8; Rodrigues, supra note 16, at 1263. R
167. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3); Brian Galle, Charities in Politics: A Reappraisal, 54 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1561, 1569 (2013).
168. I.R.C. § 501(c)(4); 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(ii) (2012); see also Ellen P. Aprill, A
Case Study of Legislation vs. Regulation: Defining Political Campaign Intervention Under Federal
Tax Law, 63 DUKE L.J. 1635, 1637 (2014); Ellen P. Aprill, Regulating the Political Speech of
Noncharitable Exempt Organizations After Citizens United, 10 ELECTION L.J. 363, 375 (2011);
Galle, supra note 167, at 1569. R
169. See Rodrigues, supra note 16, at 1263. R
170. FRUMKIN, supra note 18, at 11 (“For a time, the moniker ‘tax-exempt organizations’ was R
widely used inside government and within the legal community because it pointed—or at least
appeared to point—to the black letter of government regulation.  Yet because this approach did
not capture the huge number of clubs, associations, and groups that have never been formally
registered with the IRS, it fell out of favor . . . .”).
171. Rodrigues, supra note 16, at 1262. R
172. Fishman, supra note 148, at 619 (“There is no uniform or standard definition for a non- R
profit organization.  We use the term ‘nonprofit’ to refer to an organization that is barred from
distributing profits or net earnings to individuals who exercise control over it, such as directors,
officers, or members.”).
173. Hansmann, supra note 139, at 838. R
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primary distinction between a nonprofit corporation and a for-profit
(or business) corporation is that the nonprofit does not have stock or
other indicia of ownership that would give individuals a share in prof-
its and control.174
To be clear, nonprofits are not prohibited from earning profits; they
must simply retain any profits and devote them to further operating in
pursuit of the goals for which the organization was formed.175  Some
nonprofit corporations are in fact highly profitable.  For example, one
nonprofit hospital reported $1.2 billion in net income during the 2007
fiscal year and $7.4 billion in cash and investments—faring even better
than its average for-profit counterpart.176  Further, the nonprofit sec-
tor represents a significant percentage of gross domestic product
(GDP), with estimates between 5–12%.177  Also, nonprofits are free
to pay reasonable salary or compensation to employees and persons
who provide labor or capital.178
Because the nonprofit category is distinguished from business cor-
porations simply by the nondistribution constraint and otherwise cap-
tures a wide-ranging assortment of organizations, it does not, on its
own, provide a clear, meaningful line between corporations for corpo-
rate rights determinations.  Some nonprofit organizations are rooted
in civic and political engagement and focus on pursuing expressive,
associational activity,179 whereas some nonprofit organizations are
rooted in the expression of faith and religious values.180  But it is not
174. Id.; see David Easley & Maureen O’Hara, Optimal Nonprofit Firms, in THE ECONOMICS
OF NONPROFIT INSTITUTIONS: STUDIES IN STRUCTURE AND POLICY 85, 86 (Susan Rose-Acker-
man ed., 1986).  Although nonprofits have no shareholders because of the nondistribution con-
straint, they do have a variety of other participants: donors, clients, board members, and
employees. FRUMKIN, supra note 18, at 5.  Nonprofits may be run by a board of directors that is R
elected by members or is self-perpetuating.  Hansmann, supra note 139, at 840. R
175. Hansmann, supra note 139, at 838. R
176. Rodrigues, supra note 16, at 1261 (citing John Carreyrou & Barbara Martinez, Nonprofit R
Hospitals, Once for the Poor, Strike It Rich, WALL ST. J., Apr. 4, 2008, at A1).
177. See JAMES J. FISHMAN ET AL., NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 13
(5th ed. 2015) (citing BRICE S. MCKEEVER & SARAH L. PETTIJOHN, URBAN INSTITUTE, THE
NONPROFIT SECTOR IN BRIEF: PUBLIC CHARITIES, GIVING, AND VOLUNTEERING 1 (2014), http://
www.urban.org/sites/default/files/alfresco/publication-pdfs/413277-The-Nonprofit-Sector-in-
Brief—.PDF) (“Nonprofit organizations accounted for 5.4 percent of the gross domestic product
in 2012.”); Rodrigues, supra note 16, at 1266 (noting the estimates from a 2007 report for the R
percentage of GDP attributable to the nonprofit sector as ranging between 7–12%).
178. FISHMAN ET AL., supra note 177, at 13 (“In 2010, the last year for which reliable data is R
available, nonprofits had 13.7 million paid employees, representing 10 percent of the U.S. econ-
omy and an additional 4.8 million full-time equivalent volunteer workers were employed by
charitable institutions.”); Hansmann, supra note 139, at 838. R
179. FRUMKIN, supra note 18, at 29–31. R
180. Id. at 96, 115.  The degree to which religious belief shapes the activities of these
nonprofits widely varies, from serving as the critical organizing principle to religious-affiliated
nonprofits that do not explicitly bring faith into their activity. Id. at 115.
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obvious that all nonprofit corporations represent an identifiable group
of people associating for these expressive or religious purposes, and so
the line is likely little more than a rough starting point for analysis.
Some nonprofit corporations, such as chambers of commerce, are
primarily operated for the economic benefit of their members.181  Fur-
ther, many nonprofits provide services and goods, have become com-
mercialized, and compete with for-profit corporations in their
industries.182  Over the past few decades, funding patterns of nonprof-
its have dramatically shifted, with a decrease in private contributions
and the growing importance of earned income as a source of funding.
Professor Peter Frumkin observed:
The substitution of earned income, complemented by rising public
sector contracts, for charitable contributions is a clear sign of more
than just a change in the balance sheet of nonprofit organizations.
It is evidence of a new vision of the function of nonprofits, one that
emphasizes the entrepreneurial side of the sector.183
Other scholars have also taken notice of the “blurring” distinction be-
tween nonprofit and business corporations.184
B. The Public–Private Line
The discussion above focused on the line between for-profit (busi-
ness) corporations and nonprofit corporations.  Within the world of
business corporations, there are public corporations and private cor-
porations.  This Section examines that line between public and private
business corporations and its potential utility for corporate rights
determinations.
181. Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 156, at 302 (“[These corporations] are ‘nonprofit’ groups R
only in the limited sense that they do not engage in business with the general public for the
benefit of investors.”).
182. FRUMKIN, supra note 18, at 84, 102. R
183. Id. at 144.
184. See, e.g., FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 158, at 15–18; Anup Malani & Eric A. Posner, The
Case for For-Profit Charities, 93 VA. L. REV. 2017, 2019–20 (2007) (discussing Google’s “for-
profit charity” and “other examples of organizations devoted to charitable goals that skirt the
line between for-profit and nonprofit”); Brakman Reiser, supra note 141, at 1 (abstract) (“The R
boundary between charity and business has become a moving target.  Social enterprises, philan-
thropy divisions of for-profit companies (most notably at Google), and legislation creating hy-
brid nonprofit/for-profit forms all use business models and practices to mold and pursue
charitable objectives.”); Rodrigues, supra note 16, at 1259 (“The distinction between nonprofit R
organizations and for-profit firms is blurring before our eyes.  Corporate social responsibility,
sustainability, and green movements have made doing good an important component of many
products offered not only by nonprofits, but also by for-profit firms.”); Zolt, supra note 160, at R
396 (noting that “there has been a substantial increase in entities that blur the traditional bound-
aries between for-profit and nonprofit entities,” such as nonprofits adopting profit-oriented ap-
proaches, for-profit companies adopting charitable missions, and joint ventures between
nonprofit and for-profit organizations).
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Federal securities laws define which business corporations are pub-
lic, and, by negative implication, the rest are private.  One basic conse-
quence of being a public company is that the corporation must register
its stock and provide periodic public disclosures.185
The primary goal of federal securities regulation is to protect inves-
tors.186  Specifically, the four harms from which securities regulation
aims to protect investors are: (1) “fraud”; (2) “an unlevel informa-
tional playing field”; (3) “the extraction of private benefits from the
firm by firm insiders”; and (4) “investors’ propensity to make unwise
investment decisions.”187  Federal securities law also established the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to oversee and imple-
ment this area of law.  The SEC’s mission is “to protect investors,
maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate capital
formation.”188
This public–private line has existed since the 1930s when Congress
put in place the architecture of our federal securities regulations.189
The public trading of securities began much earlier in the United
States around the end of the eighteenth century.190  However, it was
not until the early twentieth century that periodic disclosure require-
185. STEPHEN J. CHOI & A.C. PRITCHARD, SECURITIES REGULATION: THE ESSENTIALS 85–92
(2008).
186. STEPHEN J. CHOI & A.C. PRITCHARD, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND ANALYSIS 1
(3d ed. 2012) (“Congress enacted the federal securities laws in the 1930s in the midst of the
Great Depression.  Congress’ primary goal was to protect investors who were considering put-
ting capital in the country’s financial markets.”); Michael D. Guttentag, Protection from What?
Investor Protection and the JOBS Act, 13 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 207, 212–18 (2013).  Scholars
have also cited allocative efficiency as another purpose of federal securities regulation. See, e.g.,
Merritt B. Fox, Civil Liability and Mandatory Disclosure, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 239 (2009)
(“[T]he primary way that mandatory disclosure increases social welfare is by enhancing eco-
nomic efficiency through better corporate governance and increased liquidity . . . .”).
187. Guttentag, supra note 186, at 207. R
188. E.g., The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integ-
rity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, SEC.GOV, https://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml#
.VRbh_TvF8_8 (last visited Aug. 20, 2015). In 1996, Congress passed the National Securities
Market Improvement Act, which provided that when the SEC is engaged in rulemaking, “in
addition to the protection of investors,” the Commission shall consider “whether the action will
promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation.”  National Securities Market Improve-
ment Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, § 106(b), 110 Stat. 3416, 3424 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 77b(b) (2012)); see also Guttentag, supra note 186, at 213–14. R
189. Note that this terminology differed from previous eras.  In earlier times, a “public” cor-
poration was understood to refer to a municipal corporation and all other corporations were
“private.” ANGELL & AMES, supra note 49, § 14.  The federal securities laws of the 1930s gave R
new meaning to the term “public” as it came to be understood to generally refer to business
corporations that were publicly reporting to the SEC, and all other business corporations that
were not publicly reporting to be “private.”
190. Michael D. Guttentag, Patching a Hole in the JOBS Act:  How and Why To Rewrite the
Rules that Require Firms To Make Periodic Disclosures, 88 IND. L.J. 151, 158 (2013).
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ments became a viable tool for securities regulation.  For example,
there was an emergence of the accounting profession and voluntary
disclosures by issuers trying to lower their cost of capital by credibly
committing to make periodic disclosures.191
After the stock market crash of 1929 and the onset of the Great
Depression, President Roosevelt urged Congress to regulate securities
offerings as “one step in our broad purpose of protecting investors
and depositors.”192  Congress passed the Securities Act of 1933 (Se-
curities Act) and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange
Act), which created three pathways to subject a company to public
reporting requirements: (1) listing securities on a national securities
exchange; (2) making a registered public offering under the Securities
Act; or (3) triggering registration requirements under Section 12(g) of
the Exchange Act.193
The latter provision, the Section 12(g) trigger, was passed by Con-
gress in 1964 to mandate disclosures from companies with “sufficiently
active trading markets and public interest.”194  Motivated by the pol-
icy goal of protecting investors, Congress used company assets and the
number of shareholders of record as a proxy for determining which
companies were of a sufficient size to require public status.195  The
standard chosen was a rough calculation, which has been called “edu-
cated guesswork” and “arbitrary.”196  Congress recently raised this
threshold in the JOBS Act, such that a company with total assets ex-
ceeding $10 million and a class of equity security held by 2,000 or
more shareholders of record must register under the Exchange Act.197
191. Id. at 160–61; see also Gregory Mark, On Limited Liability: A Speculative Essay on
Evolution and Justification, in TRANSFORMATIONS IN AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 169, 182
(Daniel W. Hamilton & Alfred L. Brophy eds., 2009) (discussing the development of third party
information about credit, the financial press, and securities exchange listing requirements).
192. 2 FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT, THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN
D. ROOSEVELT 93 (1938).
193. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78l(a), (f); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 112-158,
§ 12(g), 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–pp).
194. Reporting by Small Issuers, Exchange Act Release No. 23,407, 1986 WL 703825 at *2
(July 8, 1986).
195. Guttentag, supra note 190, at 166–68. R
196. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort & Robert B. Thompson, “Publicness” in Contemporary
Securities Regulation After the JOBS Act, 101 GEO. L.J. 337, 361 (2013).
197. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 501, 126 Stat. 306, 325
(2012) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(1)(A)).  To be precise, the JOBS Act in-
creased Section 12(g)’s threshold to 2,000 shareholders of record, provided that no more than
499 of those shareholders are unaccredited investors. Id. The Act refers to accredited status as a
term defined by the SEC. See generally Securities Act of 1993, 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (2014)
(defining an accredited investor).  For a discussion of the term “shareholder of record,” see
Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 196, at 355–57. R
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Private corporations are those that have not become public by one
of these three paths established by federal securities laws.  The distinc-
tion is drawn simply by those securities laws mechanics: if a corpora-
tion does not need to access public markets for capital or liquidity and
can manage its shareholder base to stay below the 2,000 shareholders
of record threshold, then a corporation can remain private and avoid
the additional cost and scrutiny of public reporting.198
For example, Facebook, Inc. was effectively forced to become a
publicly reporting corporation because it hit the pre-JOBS Act share-
holder threshold for Section 12(g), which was then 500 shareholders of
record.  Facebook could have chosen to stay private, however, if not
for “two extraordinary events” that pushed it over the line: (1) it al-
lowed employees to sell large quantities of shares on private secon-
dary markets to new shareholders and (2) it sold $1.5 billion in shares
through Goldman Sachs to new investors.199  Many companies are
choosing to stay private by more tightly managing their shareholders
of record than Facebook did; as a result, mature private companies
rival or exceed the size of many public companies as measured by
metrics such as valuation, assets, and number of employees.200
Thus, the public–private line is not a perfect proxy for large corpo-
rations, in which investor protection might be a concern, or for corpo-
rations that are the subject of public interest with a significant social
footprint.201  It is underinclusive.  It is also subject to congressional
change, as evidenced by the JOBS Act, which recently increased one
of the key thresholds to public status and made it easier for private
corporations that wish to stay private to do so.  The policy goals un-
198. CHOI & PRITCHARD, supra note 185, at 87–89; see also Elizabeth Pollman, Information R
Issues on Wall Street 2.0, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 179, 224, 235–36 (2012).
199. Steven Davidoff Solomon, Facebook May Be Forced To Go Public Amid Market Gloom,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2011, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/11/29/facebook-may-be-forced-to-
go-public-amid-market-gloom/_r=0.  For discussions of regulatory and technological changes
that have facilitated liquidity and capital formation outside of an exchange listing or public offer-
ing, see Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 196, at 346–51, 384–85; Pollman, supra note 198. R
200. See America’s Largest Private Companies List, FORBES, http://www.forbes.com/largest-
private-companies/list/ (last visited Mar. 28, 2015).
201. For a discussion of “publicness” as a concept in securities law, see Hillary A. Sale, The
New “Public” Corporation, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 2011, at 137, 137–40 (arguing that
the definition of a corporation as public by reference to whether it trades on a public market is
“impoverished” and that “the government and the media have increasing influence over public
corporations and their governance.”); see also Guttentag, supra note 190 (arguing that firms with R
a market capitalization of less than $35 million or fewer than 100 beneficial shareholders should
be exempted from public reporting requirements); Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 196, at R
375, 379–80 (exploring the public–private line and arguing that a “distinct class of systemically
significant public issuers” should be created that receives a different level of regulation than
other issuers); Pollman, supra note 198, at 235–41 (discussing the public–private line). R
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derpinning this line are economic in nature—investor protection, mar-
ket integrity, and capital formation.
However imperfect the public–private line is for purposes of securi-
ties law goals, it does serve as a rough guide to certain characteristics,
which may be useful for preliminary analysis in corporate rights line
drawing.  For example, publicly traded stock typically means that
shareholders in the corporation are constantly changing.202  They are
dispersed, passive investors.203  Shareholders in public corporations
are not an identifiable group of any lasting permanence.
Furthermore, many individuals indirectly own stock in public corpo-
rations through mutual funds, 401(k) accounts, or other pension or
retirement plans.204  In fact, “[n]inety percent of equity-owning [U.S.]
households invest in stock mutual funds.”205  The beneficial owners of
the stock often do not know which particular companies they are in-
vested in; they often do not have access to information about the cor-
porations such as about their political spending; and, they do not have
the ability to sell the stock of a particular corporation when their
money is managed by an institution.206  Because shareholders are not
a stable, identifiable group over time, and because many are institu-
tions with indirect beneficial owners, there is not an associational dy-
namic among shareholders.
Public corporations also have a changing body of employees, which
typically number in the thousands, or even hundreds of thousands.
Creditors, suppliers, and consumers are also important stakeholders in
public corporations and their relationships are contract or market-
based.  Top executives and board members represent the most identi-
fiable and stable group of corporate participants in public corpora-
tions.  They often stay in their respective posts for at least a year or
more, serving as fiduciaries for the corporation and its shareholders.
202. E.g., Usha Rodrigues, Corporate Governance in an Age of Separation of Ownership from
Ownership, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1822, 1823, 1828 (2011) (noting that “the direct holders of shares
predominantly are institutional investors” and that they “have short-term investment horizons
that can be measured in months, or even days”).
203. For a classic work documenting the separation of ownership and control, see ADOLF A.
BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY
(1948). See also WILLIAM A. KLEIN ET AL., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE 106 (11th
ed. 2010) (“The shareholders in [public] corporations do not expect to participate actively in the
operation of the business.  They are passive investors.”).
204. See Jill E. Fisch, Securities Intermediaries and the Separation of Ownership from Control,
33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 877, 879, 879 n.13 (2010) (noting that, as of 2009, “institutional investors
owned 50% of total U.S. equities”).
205. INV. CO. INST. & SEC. INDUS. ASS’N, EQUITY OWNERSHIP IN AMERICA 1 (2005), http://
www.sifma.org/WorkArea/linkit.aspx?LinkIdentifier=id&ItemID=21625&libID=5791.
206. See Elizabeth Pollman, Citizens Not United: The Lack of Stockholder Voluntariness in
Corporate Political Speech, 119 YALE L.J. ONLINE 53, 56 (2009).
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They are stewards for the corporation itself and the entity status of the
corporation under the law allows for this complex set of relationships
to constantly evolve and change and for the corporation to function as
a lasting institution.
In addition, public corporations have a business purpose.  A more
precise articulation of this point is not possible without invoking chal-
lenge.  The question of corporate purpose has divided corporate law
scholars for nearly a century, and of particular controversy is whether
the law requires shareholder wealth maximization as a default rule.207
Setting aside these particulars, we can observe that public corpora-
tions are business corporations—they are businesses operated through
the for-profit corporate form for which equity holders can receive
distributions.
In light of these characteristics of public corporations, it would be
hard to justify extending a derivative right to a public corporation,
especially with regard to rights that extend beyond contract and prop-
erty interests incidental to the corporate form.  The participants in a
public corporation generally do not constitute a relatively stable, iden-
tifiable group of persons, and their organization and relationships with
each other are not associational.208
Thus the line drawn by securities laws regarding “public” corpora-
tions has some, albeit rough, explanatory power for corporate rights
determinations.  It could be a starting point in analysis, which con-
firms that a derivative right is not at stake.209  We could also observe
that any decision to extend rights to public corporations would be lim-
ited and would require an instrumental justification if, for example,
the interests of third parties necessitated extending certain limited
protection for the speech of public corporations.210
The Supreme Court’s dicta in Hobby Lobby regarding public cor-
porations did not reflect such a nuanced understanding.  Not only is it
“unlikely” that these “corporate giants” would “often assert RFRA
claims[,]” as the Court stated,211 the derivative basis on which the
207. See Pollman, supra note 33, at 159–62 (discussing the corporate purpose debate). R
208. Blair & Pollman, supra note 38, at 1739; see Nelson, supra note 74, at 510. R
209. In other work, I have shown how we could use the public corporation line as a rough way
of starting analysis regarding whether various corporations have, or should have, a constitutional
right to privacy, a novel question.  Elizabeth Pollman, A Corporate Right to Privacy, 99 MINN. L.
REV. 27, 63–64 (2014).
210. Blair & Pollman, supra note 38, at 1740; see also POST, supra note 132, at 70 (“Ordinary R
commercial corporations are not expressive associations, and for this reason they may not assert
the First Amendment rights of persons who make up ordinary commercial corporations. . . .  If
ordinary commercial corporations possess First Amendment rights, therefore, it must be as prox-
ies for the rights of persons who are strangers to the corporation.”).
211. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2774 (2014).
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Court accorded RFRA protections to the closely held corporations
would be insupportable.  The Court grounded its analysis on the sin-
cerely held religious beliefs of the shareholders of the closely held
corporations:
An established body of law specifies the rights and obligations of
the people (including shareholders, officers, and employees) who
are associated with a corporation in one way or another.  When
rights, whether constitutional or statutory, are extended to corpora-
tions, the purpose is to protect the rights of these people. . . .
[P]rotecting the free-exercise rights of corporations like Hobby
Lobby, Conestoga, and Mardel protects the religious liberty of the
humans who own and control those companies.212
And, with regard to public corporations, the Court added: “the idea
that unrelated shareholders—including institutional investors with
their own set of stakeholders—would agree to run a corporation
under the same religious beliefs seems improbable.”213  Not only is
this agreement improbable, but in publicly traded corporations the
stock is liquid and trades frequently—there is rarely a stable, identifi-
able group of people “who own and control” the corporation.  Fur-
ther, a corporation could have a provision in its corporate charter
regarding operation in accordance with religious dictates, but when
stock trades on a public exchange, there is no mechanism to ensure
that the shareholders actually have sincerely held religious beliefs,
which was also essential to the Court’s holding.  Finally, as previously
discussed, shareholders in public corporations are dispersed passive
and institutional investors, so the notions of complicity and burdening
of religious exercise could also be called into question.214
C. The Closely Held Category
There is no singular definition of a closely held corporation.  State
corporate law does not draw a clear line between corporations consid-
ered closely held and those that are not.  Instead, the public–private
line exists from federal securities laws, as discussed above, and then
within the realm of private business corporations, there is the notion
of closely held corporations as a loose subset.215  The term “closely
212. Id. at 2768.
213. Id at 2774.
214. For a discussion of the concept of complicity in Hobby Lobby, see Douglas NeJaime &
Reva B. Siegel, Conscience Wars: Complicity-Based Conscience Claims in Religion and Politics,
124 YALE L.J. 2516, 2518–22 (2015); Amy J. Sepinwall, Conscience and Complicity: Assessing
Pleas for Religious Exemptions in Hobby Lobby’s Wake, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1897 (2015).
215. One way of thinking about categories of private corporations is as
(1) ‘startup’ corporations, founded with the goal of creating innovative products or
services and a relatively quick financial pay off for the founders, employees, and
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held” is typically understood to refer to a corporation with a small
number of shareholders whose shares are not readily transferable and
who are often involved in managing the corporation.216  Sometimes
closely held corporations are compared with partnerships in their
dynamics.217
The American Bar Association (ABA) Committee on Corporate
Laws listed several attributes of closely held corporations in addition
to having a relatively small number of shareholders: (1) shareholders
are frequently involved in managing or operating the business; (2)
management structure and corporate governance rules may be cus-
tomized; (3) little liquidity exists in the corporate stock; (4) no readily
observable market price is available for the corporate stock; (5) finan-
cial and other information is generally not publicly available; (6) dead-
locks may arise; and (7) limited resources may result in inattention to
corporate formalities and recordkeeping.218  According to the ABA
Committee, the closely held corporation is “the most common form of
business organization in the United States.”219
Notably, the small number of shareholders is an essential feature of
the closely held corporation, but the size of the business is not deter-
minative.220  Closely held corporations range from very small to very
investors who are typically angel investors and venture capitalists; and (2) busi-
nesses that operate through the corporate form for the various advantages that it
offers, while not triggering the thresholds for becoming a publicly reporting
corporation.
Pollman, supra note 2, at 626. R
216. E.g., Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of N. Eng., Inc., 328 N.E.2d 505, 511 (Mass.
1975) (“We deem a close corporation to be typified by: (1) a small number of stockholders; (2)
no ready market for the corporate stock; and (3) substantial majority stockholder participation
in the management, direction and operations of the corporation.”); BAINBRIDGE, supra note 1, R
§ 14.1; MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS
307–13 (8th ed. 2000).  Some corporate law scholars have focused not on the number of share-
holders but rather on “the owners’ desire to control the identity of the ‘partners’ and keep own-
ership ‘close.’” See, e.g., ARTHUR R. PINTO & DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, UNDERSTANDING
CORPORATE LAW § 11.01 (3d ed. 2009) (“The owners may wish to limit shareholding to family
members, employees, persons who live in the vicinity of the corporation’s business, and the
like.”).
217. E.g., Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 512 (noting the “striking resemblance” of a closely held
corporation to a partnership and that commentators and courts have described the closely held
corporation as “little more than an ‘incorporated’ or ‘chartered’ partnership”); SHAWN J.
BAYERN, CLOSELY HELD ORGANIZATIONS 193 (2014) (referring to closely held corporations as
“those with few owners, whose structure and function are ordinarily not that different, in sub-
stantive terms, from that of a partnership”).
218. Comm. on Corporate Laws, ABA Section of Bus. Law, Managing Closely Held Corpora-
tions: A Legal Guidebook, 58 BUS. LAW. 1077, 1081–85 (2003) [hereinafter, ABA Comm.].
219. Id. at 1077.
220. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 1, § 14.1; ABA Comm., supra note 218, at 1081 (“Although R
closely held corporations are often small businesses, closely held status has nothing to do with
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large businesses.221  For example, Hobby Lobby would be considered
a closely held corporation because it has only five shareholders (held
through a trust), its shares are not publicly traded, and its sharehold-
ers are involved in the management of the corporation.  But Hobby
Lobby is not a small business by any stretch of the imagination: it is a
nationwide chain with over 600 stores, more than 13,000 employees,
and $3.3 billon in sales revenues annually.222  The Hobby Lobby ex-
ample underscores the fact that the term “closely held” does not mean
small business.223
The concept of the closely held corporation was born from concerns
in state corporate law about illiquidity and the potential exploitation
of minority shareholders.224  These concerns stem directly from the
fact that the hallmark characteristics of a closely held corporation are
the small number of shareholders and lack of a public trading market.
If shareholders cannot protect themselves by selling their shares, their
voices in the corporation and the rules of conduct for the majority
shareholders become more important.  Anticipating exploitation is-
sues and a lack of exit options, minority shareholders have attempted
to address their concerns with contractual provisions that vary the
normal corporate governance rules.225  In addition, courts in a number
of jurisdictions have created heightened fiduciary duties in the closely
size.  A number of the largest corporations in the world, in terms of assets and revenues, are
closely held.”).
221. ABA Comm., supra note 218, at 1081 (“Closely held corporations include a very diverse R
range of business associations from one-shareholder corporations to family-owned businesses to
wholly owned subsidiaries to corporate joint ventures.”).
222. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2765 (2014); #118 Hobby
Lobby Stores, supra note 34.  As noted supra, Forbes estimated that Hobby Lobby has 23,000 R
employees. Id.  Notable examples of other economically large private corporations include Car-
gill and Koch Industries, which each have annual revenues over $100 billion and 100,000 or more
employees. See America’s Largest Private Companies List, supra note 200.  Examples also in- R
clude companies that have once been public but were taken private again, such as computer
manufacturer Dell, which has annual revenues over $50 billion and more than 100,000 employ-
ees. Id.
223. Justice Ginsburg made this point in her Hobby Lobby dissent. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct.
at 2797 n.19 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“[A]s Hobby Lobby’s case demonstrates, such [RFRA]
claims are indeed pursued by large corporations, employing thousands of persons of different
faiths, whose ownership is not diffuse.  ‘Closely held’ is not synonymous with ‘small.’”); see also
Sarah Barringer Gordon & Nomi Stolzenberg, Hobby Lobby, Wheaton College, and a New Re-
ligious Order, RELIGION & POL. (July 14, 2014), http://religionandpolitics.org/2014/07/14/hobby-
lobby-wheaton-college-and-a-new-religious-order/  (“The scale and nature of Hobby Lobby and
Conestoga Wood make it hard to see any meaningful distinction between the closely held and
publicly traded corporate forms.”).
224. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 1, § 14.1; PINTO & BRANSON, supra note 216, § 11.01. R
225. PINTO & BRANSON, supra note 216, § 11.01 (discussing contractual responses in closely R
held corporations, such as supermajority quorum and voting, and minority protections in share-
holder agreements).
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held context.226  The relevance of being closely held in corporate law
is therefore the applicability of doctrines concerning shareholder pri-
vate ordering (such as shareholder management agreements, voting
trusts, voting pools, buyout agreements) as well as potentially more
expansive fiduciary duties.
More than a dozen states have enacted special “close” corporation
statutes to make clear that participants can provide for special reme-
dies, such as mandatory share repurchases or dissolution for deadlock
or oppression.227  Requirements for the statutorily created “closely
held” business form vary state to state,228 for example, with limits on
the number of shareholders ranging from ten to fifty.229  These statu-
tory forms are not commonly used, however, and they are not availa-
ble in all states, so they do not act as a constraint on how the more
general term “closely held” is understood.230
Because the closely held category is only loosely created by state
corporate law doctrines regarding shareholder minority oppression
and heightened fiduciary duties, it does not, on its own, provide a
clear, meaningful line between corporations for corporate rights de-
terminations.  However, like the nonprofit–profit and public–private
lines discussed above, it may be a useful, yet rough, starting point for
analysis.
For example, because of their hallmark characteristics, closely held
corporations are more likely than public corporations and other types
of private corporations to represent an identifiable group of share-
holders who may have come together in an associational dynamic to
pursue a business venture and, perhaps, other social, political, or relig-
ious goals.  Many closely held corporations are family owned and op-
erated, which arguably assures an intimacy or associational dynamic
226. Id. § 11.02; see, e.g., Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of N. Eng. Inc., 328 N.E.2d 505,
515 (Mass. 1975); 1 F. HODGE O’NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O’NEAL’S CLOSE CORPORA-
TIONS § 7.20 (3d ed. 2002); 1 F. HODGE O’NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O’NEAL’S OPPRES-
SION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS § 7.04 (2d ed. 2003) (citing Donahue, 328 N.E.2d 505).
227. PINTO & BRANSON, supra note 216, §§ 11.06–.07.  The terms “close corporation” and R
“closely held corporation” are sometimes used interchangeably, but close corporation can refer
more specifically to closely held corporations that have made a special statutory election in their
articles of incorporation for close corporation status.  ABA Comm., supra note 218, at 1081 n.3. R
228. 1A FLETCHER, supra note 1, § 70.10. R
229. See, e.g., AZ. REV. STAT ANN. § 10-1083 (2014); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-902 (2003); MO.
REV. STAT. § 351.755 (2014).
230. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 1, § 14.1 (“[T]hese statutes are little used.”); Harwell Wells, The R
Rise of the Close Corporation and the Making of Corporation Law, 5 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 263,
314 (2008) (“While fifteen states eventually adopted integrated statutes, remarkably few close
corporations chose to take advantage of them.  Empirical studies show that only a very small
percentage of corporations ever registered as statutory close corporations.”).
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among the shareholders, as might ownership and control being more
generally united in a small number of shareholders.
But closely held corporations can be big business—they can have
huge numbers of employees and independent boards of directors—
and having a small number of shareholders does not ensure that the
dynamic in the corporation is associational, unanimous, or related to
anything other than economics.  Therefore, further analysis is needed
beyond simply using the term “closely held” to determine whether a
derivative basis exists to justify extending a constitutional or statutory
protection to the corporation.
In Hobby Lobby, the Court used the closely held category in a for-
malistic way without going beyond the mere starting point that this
concept provides.  As previously noted, the term “closely held” per-
vaded the majority opinion,231 but the Court neither provided a defi-
nition nor pinpointed which characteristics were required for its
ruling.  For example, it did not explain the relevance for RFRA pur-
poses of family ownership or the involvement of the shareholders in
the management of the corporations.  And, as noted above, the Court
expressed doubt that a public corporation would bring a RFRA claim,
but its language did not impose such a limit or acknowledge that a
derivative basis for religious liberty rights would be absent in public
corporations.  Moreover, the Court did not explain why only the
shareholders who own and control the corporation are the subject of
focus for its derivative rights rationale.232  As a result, the U.S. De-
partments of Labor, Treasury, and HHS had little guidance for their
rulemaking on eligible organizations for exemption from the ACA’s
contraception coverage requirement.  After significant public debate,
reflected in more than 75,000 comments to proposed regulations, the
Departments published final regulations defining the term “closely
held” corporation for the purpose of implementing Hobby Lobby.233
Thus, in one of the most important recent cases concerning the rights
of corporations, the Court pushed much of the difficult line-drawing
work to other institutions.
231. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, passim (2014).
232. Pollman, supra note 33, at 157–58. R
233. Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 80 Fed. Reg.
41,318 (July 14, 2015) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54, 29 C.F.R. pts. 2510 and 2590, 45 C.F.R.
pt. 147).  The regulations extend the Hobby Lobby accommodation “to a for-profit entity that is
not publicly traded, is majority-owned by a relatively small number of individuals, and objects to
providing contraceptive coverage based on its owners’ religious beliefs.” Id. at 41,324.  The defi-
nition “includes for-profit entities that are controlled and operated by individual owners who are
likely to have associational ties, are personally identified with the entity, and can be regarded as
conducting personal business affairs through the entity.” Id.
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IV. CONCLUSION
One of the most important tasks facing the Supreme Court in its
decisions concerning the scope of corporate rights is to appropriately
distinguish between different corporations.  Failing at this task has sig-
nificant consequences; it impairs the integrity of our elections and the
ability of our legislatures to regulate corporations in the interest of
society.
This Article has underscored the need for the Court to better un-
derstand the diversity of corporations in existence and the need for
line drawing between corporations in rights determinations.  The
Court’s own derivative rights logic does not support granting protec-
tions to all corporations.  Further, this Article advanced the discussion
by examining the utility of lines that the law has already drawn: the
for-profit–nonprofit line, the public–private line, and the closely held
category.  This Article showed that these constructs may be a useful
starting point for analysis, but they are not a straightforward solution
to the line drawing issue because they were developed in other areas
of law to serve different values and goals than may be at stake in cor-
porate rights determinations.
